Lebanese Shi'ites Back State Control of Arms

Results from a September survey have indicated a significant shift in sentiment among Lebanon's Shi'ite population regarding the status of Hezbollah. The data suggests that a majority within the community now supports the transfer of the militant group's weapons to the Lebanese state. This development marks a notable departure from the traditional stance that has defined the relationship between the sect and the organization for decades.

The poll was conducted by Statistics Lebanon among 800 Shi'ite respondents. The findings showed that 66.4 percent favored handing over the arsenal to the state, while 29.6 percent preferred that Hezbollah retain its weapons. Further details reported by the Christian Kataeb Party website revealed that 71.1 percent of those surveyed believed decisions on war and peace should belong exclusively to the state. Only 5.9 percent said Hezbollah's leadership should play a larger role in shaping the country's future.

Trust in the Lebanese Armed Forces also appeared high in the data. Approximately 78.5 percent of respondents expressed confidence in the army, and 51.1 percent identified it as the institution best positioned to guarantee long term security. In contrast, only 16.5 percent selected Hezbollah for that role. These figures challenge the group's long held claim to be the primary representative of Shi'ite security interests.

Despite these shifts, the overall picture remains complex. About 67.4 percent of respondents indicated that Hezbollah had either failed to meet its goals in the conflict with Israel or had achieved only some of them. A further 42.1 percent expressed disappointment, anger, or concern about the group's leadership and the aftermath of the war. Nevertheless, 59.5 percent still reported some level of trust in the organization, including 37.1 percent who said they had a great deal of trust.

Roi Kais of Israel's public broadcaster KAN noted that the support networks and status Hezbollah provides to the sect continue to sustain its strength. He argued that this influence will persist as long as no other entity fills the resulting vacuum. This view aligns with an earlier analysis by researchers Orna Mizrahi and Moran Levanoni at Israel's Institute for National Security Studies. They cited a May 2026 survey in which 87.5 percent of Shi'ites opposed disarming Hezbollah. They attributed the group's endurance to its social and economic networks, political power, and the historical marginalization of the sect.

The discrepancy between the two polls raises questions about how wording or agenda may have shaped the results. Mizrahi and Levanoni suggested that weakening Hezbollah would require a stronger army and financial support from Western and Gulf states. They argued that the state must eventually replace the services currently provided by the group. Intimidation has also been cited as a factor that discourages open dissent within the community.

Signs of local wariness have emerged in specific areas. In the southern city of Tyre, property owners reportedly opposed the opening of a branch of Al Qard Al Hassan, a financial institution linked to Hezbollah. They feared the branch could become a target in an Israeli strike, a risk that has materialized in the past. Meanwhile, the group has announced aid of up to 14,000 dollars for eligible families in Beirut and its southern suburbs whose primary homes were destroyed, with up to 12,000 dollars available elsewhere.

Hezbollah has suffered significant military and leadership losses in recent years, including the killing of Hassan Nasrallah in September 2024. A new conflict that began in March 2026 caused heavy destruction in villages in southern Lebanon. Whether the current discontent translates into political change may depend on the ability of the Lebanese state to provide security, reconstruction, and economic opportunity.